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MEASURING VOTING POWER IN CONVEX POLICY SPACES
ABSTRACT. Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the
aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed
to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here
we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the
analysis of a collection of economic problems like e.g. tax rates or spending that otherwise would
not be covered in binary models.
Keywords: power; single peaked preferences; convex policy space; group decision making;
Shapley-Shubik index; Banzhaf index; nucleolus; simple games; multiple levels of approval
1. INTRODUCTION
Important decisions are likely made by groups of experts or in the democratic decision-
making context by voters. Giving a set of experts opinions or the votes of the population or
representatives within a committee, usually the aggregated decision is (deterministically) deter-
mined according to a certain decision rule. Examples of such decision (or aggregation) rules are
the majority rule, which selects the alternative that has a majority, or more generally weighted
voting rules like e.g. used by the US Electoral College or the EU Council of Ministers.
Given such a decision rule it is quite natural to ask for the individual power, by which we
understand the ability to influence the aggregated decision, of the committee members or voters.
A lot of literature is concerned with measuring this voting power under certain circumstances.
But in our opinion the answers given so far are not completely satisfactory. To this end we quote
[44]:
“Scientists who study power in political and economic institutions seem divided
into two disjoint methodological camps. The first one uses non-cooperative
game theory to analyze the impact of explicit decision procedures and given
preferences over a well-defined – usually Euclidean – policy space. The sec-
ond one stands in the tradition of cooperative game theory with much more
abstractly defined voting bodies: the considered agents have no particular pref-
erences and form winning coalitions which implement unspecified policies. In-
dividual chances of being part of and influencing a winning coalition are then
measured by a power index.
. . .
Several authors have concluded that it is time to develop a unified framework for
measuring decision power (cf. [16, 49]). ”
A similar opinion is e.g. shared in [27, 35]. Within the tradition of [44] we try to develop
such a unified framework for measuring decision power. Our starting point is the well developed
theory of so-called simple games, see [50], within the field of cooperative game theory. The big
drawback of simple games is that both – the voters and the aggregated decision – are binary.
In [14] the authors propose abstention as a third option for the voters, which they argue to
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occur quite frequently in practice. At the end of their paper they drastically conclude ignoring
abstention causes serious errors when evaluating the power of real-world voting systems:
“It seems that we are confronted here with a clear-cut case of theory-laden (or
theory-biased) observation. Scientists, equipped with a ready-made theoretical
conception, ’observe’ in reality phenomena that fit that conception. And where
the phenomena do not quite fit the theory, they are at best consciously ignored,
but more often actually mis-perceived and tweaked into the theoretical mould.”
This statement causes several follow-up papers. In [20] the authors considered simple games
with multiple levels of approval. If the voters can choose between j (ordered) alternatives and
the aggregated decision is taken between k (ordered) alternatives, those games are called (j, k)
simple games, so that the examples of [14] fit in as (3, 2)-simple games. We remark that other
authors consider similar extensions where the alternatives are not ordered, see e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8]. Power indices for (j, k) simple games were e.g. introduced in [17, 18], while the basic ideas
have been developed for the special case of (3, 2) simple games in earlier papers like e.g. [14].
In this paper we want to consider convex policy spaces with a continuum of alternatives.
To keep things simple and partially supported by empirical evidence, i.e. the authors of [9]
show that the individuals (more-dimensional) opinions can often be well approximated by a 1-
dimensional line, we assume the policy space to be 1-dimensional. Moreover we normalize the
policy space, of both the input and the output, to the real interval [0, 1]. To be more precisely
we consider the real interval [0, 1] of policy alternatives with single peaked preferences. In some
sense those games can be considered as the limit of (j, k) simple games, where both j and k tend
to infinity. Going from binary {0, 1}-decisions to continuous [0, 1]-decisions allows the analysis
of a collection of economic problems like e.g. tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be
covered in binary models.
Almost the whole literature on voting power is limited to binary or discrete models – a few
exceptions are given by e.g. [24, 37, 38, 39, 44, 49].
The aim of this paper is to propose a generalization of some of the notions for simple games
with binary {0, 1}-decisions to continuous [0, 1]-decisions in a consistent way. To this end we
review some basic definitions and results for binary simple games in Section 2. Some of the
usual notation is slightly modified so that the coincidence with our definitions for the continuous
case becomes more transparent. In Section 3 we briefly introduce (j, k) simple games. Directly
after, we propose basic definitions and first results for continuous simple games in Section 4.
In Section 5 we give some examples of continuous simple games. Generalized versions of
three selected power indices are given in Section 6. The case of vote distributions, where not
all alternatives are equipropable, is briefly treated in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8 and
suggest some research question which may carry forward the development of a unified theory
of power measurement. Some power index computations for examples of certain continuous
simple games are delayed to an appendix.
2. BINARY DECISION RULES
A binary decision (or aggregation) rule can me modeled as a function v : 2N → {0, 1}
mapping the coalition S of supporters, i.e. those who vote “yes”, to the aggregated group decision
v(S) ∈ {0, 1}. Within the remaining part of the paper we denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of
n ∈ N voters and by 2N its power set, i.e. the set of its subsets. In the following we specialize
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those Boolean functions more and more by requiring desirable properties of a binary decision
rule. Quite naturally we require:
(1) if no voter is in favor of a proposal, reject it;
(2) if all voters are in favor of a proposal, accept it.
Definition 2.1. A Boolean game is a function v : 2N → {0, 1} with v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1.
The set of all Boolean games on n players is denoted by Bn.
We remark that some authors drop the condition v(N) = 1. When the group of support-
ing voters is enlarged we would usually expect that the group decision does not change from
acceptance to rejection. This is formalized in:
Definition 2.2. A simple game is a Boolean game v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(S) 6 v(T) for all
∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N. The set of all simple games on n players is denoted by Sn.
We call subsets S ⊆ N coalitions. Those coalitions come in two types, i.e. either we have
v(S) = 1 or v(S) = 0. We speak of a winning coalition in the first and of a losing coalition
in the second case. The set of all winning or the set of all losing coalitions are both sufficient
to uniquely characterize a simple game. A winning coalition, with the property that all proper
subsets are losing, is called minimal winning. Similarly, we call a losing coalition maximal
losing if all of its proper supersets are winning.
Definition 2.3. Let v be a Boolean game. By W we denote the set of all winning and by Wm
we denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions of v. Similarly, by L we denote the set of all
losing and by LM we denote the set of all maximal losing coalitions of v.
We remark that both Wm and LM are sufficient to uniquely characterize a simple game. An
example of a simple game for three players is given by W =
{
{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}
}
. The remaining
six coalitions in N\W are losing. The unique minimal winning coalition is given by {1, 2} and
LM =
{
{1, 3}, {2, 3}
}
.
Definition 2.4. A voter that is not contained in any minimal winning coalition is called a null
voter.
In our previous example voter 3 is a null voter. For the next definition we assume that we
let our committee decide on a certain proposal and its logical negation. It may be seen as
somewhat strange if both proposals would be accepted under the same preferences of the voters.
So anticipating the next definition, we can state that the most studied simple games are generally
proper.
Definition 2.5. A simple game is called proper if the complementN\S of any winning coalition
S is losing. It is called strong if the complement N\S of any losing coalition S is winning. A
simple game that is both proper and strong is called constant-sum (or self-dual, or decisive).
The desirability relation, introduced in [28], assumes a certain intuitive ordering of the voters:
Definition 2.6. Given a simple game, characterized by its set of winning coalitions W ⊆ 2N,
we say that voter i ∈ N is more desirable as voter j ∈ N, denoted by i  j, if
(1) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} with S ∪ {j} ∈W, we have S ∪ {i} ∈W;
(2) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} with S ∪ {i} ∈ L, we have S ∪ {j} ∈ L = 2N\W.
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We write i ' j if i  j, j  i and use i  j as abbreviation for i  j, i 6' j.
As an abbreviation we write (W, N) for a Boolean game with W ⊆ 2N as its set of winning
coalitions.
Definition 2.7. A simple game (W, N) is called complete if for each pair of voters i, j ∈ N we
have i  j or j  i. The set of all complete (simple) games on n voters is denoted by Cn.
We remark that our previous example of a simple game is complete and we have 1 ' 2  3.
Definition 2.8. Let (W, N) be a complete simple game, where 1  2  · · ·  n, and S ⊆ N
be arbitrary. A coalition T ⊆ N is a direct left-shift of S whenever there exists a voter i ∈ S
with i − 1 /∈ S such that T = S\{i} ∪ {i − 1} for i > 1 or T = S ∪ {n} for n /∈ S. Similarly, a
coalition T ⊆ N is a direct right-shift of S whenever there exists a voter i ∈ S with i + 1 /∈ S
such that T = S\{i} ∪ {i + 1} for i < n or T = S\{n} for n ∈ S. A coalition T is a left-shift
of S if it arises as a sequence of direct left-shifts. Similarly, it is a right-shift of S if it arises as
a sequence of direct right-shifts. A winning coalition S such that all right-shifts of S are losing
is called shift-minimal (winning). Similarly, a winning coalition S such that all left-shifts of S
are winning is called shift-maximal (losing). By Wsm we denote the set of all shift-minimal
minimal winning coalitions of (W, N) and by LsM the set of all shift-maximal losing coalitions.
In our example we have Wsm =
{
{1, 2}
}
and LsM =
{
{1, 3}
}
since {2, 3} is a direct right-
shift of {1, 3}. Both of the sets Wsm or LsM are sufficient to uniquely characterize a complete
simple game. Some simple games permit a more compact representation using just n + 1 non-
negative real numbers:
Definition 2.9. A simple game (W, N) is weighted if there exists a quota q > 0 and weights
w1, . . . , wn > 0 such that coalition S is winning if and only if w(S) =
∑
i∈Swi > q. We
denote the corresponding game by [q;w1, . . . , wn]. The set of all weighted (simple) games on
n voters is denoted by Tn.
We remark that each weighted game v admits several weighted representations [q;w], e.g.
if [q;w] is a weighted representation for v, then [λ · q; λ · w] is also a weighted representation
for all λ ∈ R>0. The set of weighted representations of a given weighted game v is even more
involved. As an example we remark that [2; 1, 1, 1] and [5; 4, 3, 2] represent the same game. Our
initial example of a simple game can be written as [2; 1, 1, 0].
We remark that all weighted simple games are complete. Not every complete simple game
is weighted1, but every simple game is the intersection of finitely many weighted games. The
minimum number needed is called dimension of the simple game. The number |Cn| of complete
simple games with n voters grows much faster than the number |Tn| of weighted simple games
with n voters, see e.g. [32]. Similarly, the number |Sn| of simple games with n voters grows
much faster than the number |Cn| of complete simple games with n voters, see. e.g. [34].
In the following we will commonly consider so-called normalized weights w ∈ Rn>0, where
‖w‖1 =
∑n
i=1wi = 1. As an abbreviation we use w(S) =
∑
i∈Swi for coalitions S ⊆ N.
For weighted simple games the properties proper, strong, and constant-sum are ultimately linked
with the quota q:
1We have Sn ⊆ Cn ⊆ Tn, Sn 6= Cn for n > 4, and Cn 6= Tn for n > 6.
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Lemma 2.10. A weighted game v with normalized weightsw ∈ Rn>0, i.e. ‖w‖1 = 1, and quota
q ∈ (0, 1] is proper if and only if there exists a weighted representation with normalized weights
w ′ ∈ Rn>0 and quota q ′ ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
.
PROOF. If q > 12 , then for each winning coalition S with w(S) > q we have w(N\S) =
1−w(S) 6 1− q < 12 < q so that N\S has to be losing and the game v is proper.
For the other direction we assume that v is proper. From Definition 2.1 we conclude w 6= 0,
so that we can set w ′ = w‖w‖1 , i.e. we normalize the weights to sum 1. Next we set
q1 = max
S∈L
w ′(S) and q2 = max
S∈W
w ′(S),
where obviously 0 6 q1 < q2 6 1 due to the definition of a weighted game. Each choice of
q ′ ∈ (q1, q2] corresponds to the same weighted game. Thus it remains to prove that q2 > 12 .
Assume to the contrary q2 6 12 . Let S ∈W 6= ∅ be an arbitrary winning coalition. Since
w ′(N\S) = w ′(N) −w ′(S) = 1−w ′(S) > 1− q2 >
1
2
> q2,
the complementary coalitionN\S would be also winning, which is a contraction to the assump-
tion that v is proper. 
Lemma 2.11. A weighted game v with normalized weights w ∈ Rn>0 and quota q ∈ (0, 1] is
strong if and only if there exists a weighted representation with normalized weights w ′ ∈ Rn>0
and quota q ′ ∈
(
0, 12
]
.
PROOF. If q 6 12 , then for each losing coalition S with w(S) < q we have w(N\S) =
1−w(S) > 1− q > 12 > q so that N\S has to be winning and the game v is strong.
For the other direction we assume that v is strong. From Definition 2.1 we conclude w 6= 0,
so that we can set w ′ = w‖w‖1 , i.e. we normalize the weights to sum 1. Next we set
q1 = max
S∈L
w ′(S) and q2 = max
S∈W
w ′(S),
where obviously 0 6 q1 < q2 6 1 due to the definition of a weighted game. Each choice of
q ′ ∈ (q1, q2] corresponds to the same weighted game. Thus it remains to prove that q1 < 12 .
Assume to the contrary q1 > 12 . Let S ∈ L 6= ∅ be an arbitrary losing coalition with w ′(S) =
q1. Since
w ′(N\S) = w ′(N) −w ′(S) = 1−w ′(S) = 1− q1 6
1
2
6 q1,
the complementary coalitionN\Swould be also losing, which is a contraction to the assumption
that v is strong. 
We remark that given a weighted representation of a weighted game v, the value of the quota
q ∈ (0, 1] is not sufficient to exactly determine whether is proper or non-proper. Similarly q is
not sufficient to exactly determine whether is strong or non-strong. As an example we consider
the weighted game [2; 1, 1, 1]. For each q ∈
(
1
3 ,
2
3
]
the representation
[
q; 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
]
gives the
same game.
Lemma 2.12. A weighted game v is constant-sum if and only if there exists a ε > 0 such that
for all q ∈ (12 − ε, 12 + ε) there exists a normalized weighted representation with quota q.
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PROOF. If there exists a weighted representation of v with q = 12 , then v is strong. If there
exists a weighted representation of v with q = 12 +
ε
2 >
1
2 , then v is proper.
For the other direction we assume that v is constant-sum. Let [q;w] we an arbitrary weighted
representation of v, where ‖w‖1 = 1. From Definition 2.1 we conclude w 6= 0, so that we can
set w ′ = w‖w‖1 , i.e. we normalize the weights to sum 1. Next we set
q1 = max
S∈L
w ′(S) and q2 = max
S∈W
w ′(S),
where obviously 0 6 q1 < q2 6 1 due to the definition of a weighted game. Each choice of
q ′ ∈ (q1, q2] corresponds to the same weighted game. From the proofs of Lemma 2.10 and
Lemma 2.11 we conclude q2 > 12 and q1 <
1
2 . This obviously admits the choice of a suitable
ε > 0. 
In order to measure the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by
changing its own vote, a vast amount of so-called power indices was introduced, see e.g. [2]. A
common core is captured by:
Definition 2.13. Let Vn ⊆ Bn a class of Boolean games consisting of n voters. A power index
(on Vn) is a mapping P : Vn → Rn.
Power indices may have several nice properties:
Definition 2.14. Let g : Vn → Rn = (gi)i∈N be a power index on a class Vn of Boolean
games. We say that
(1) g is symmetric: if for all v ∈ Vn and any bijection τ : N → N we have gτ(i)(τv) =
gi(v), where τv(S) = v(τ(S)) for any coalition S ⊆ N;
(2) g is positive: if for all v ∈ Vn and all i ∈ N we have gi(v) > 0 and g(v) 6= 0;
(3) g is efficient: if for all v ∈ Vn we have
∑n
i=1 gi(v) = 1;
(4) g satisfies the null voter property: if for all v ∈ Vn and all null voters i of v we have
gi(v) = 0.
Examples of power indices for simple games are e.g. the Shapley-Shubik index [47]
SSIi(v) :=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N|− 1− |S|)!
|N|!
· (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) (1)
and the absolute Banzhaf index [1]
BZIi(v) :=
1
2n−1
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)) (2)
for all i ∈ N.
We remark that both indices are symmetric, positive and satisfy the null voter property onBn.
The Shapley-Shubik index is efficient on Sn, while it is generally not efficient onBn. Whenever
a given positive power index P : Vn → Rn is not efficient, we can consider its normalization
Pi(v)/
∑n
j=1 Pj(v).
Boolean games where further generalized:
Definition 2.15. A coalitional game is a function v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0.
Definition 2.16. Let Vn be a subclass of coalitional games consisting of n voters. A value (on
Vn) is a mapping P : Vn → Rn.
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Several of the classical power indices have a more general definition as a value. Of course
values may also have some of the properties defined in Definition 2.14. Additionally values can
linear, i.e. we have
P(λ1 · v1 + λ2 · v2) = λ1 · P(v1) + λ2 · P(v2) (3)
for all λ1, λ2 ∈ R and all coalitional games v1, v2 ∈ Vn.
We complete this section with the definition of the third power index, which is studied and
generalized in this paper. To this end let v be a simple game. We call a vector x ∈ Rn>0
with x(N) = 1 an imputation. The excess of a coalition S for imputation x (in v) is given by
e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S). Let S1, . . . , S2n be an ordering of all coalitions such that the excess at
x is weakly decreasing. The excess vector is the vector E(x) = (e(x, Sk))16k62n . Imputation
x is lexicographically less than imputation y if Ek(x) < Ek(y) for the smallest component k
with Ek(x) 6= Ek(y). With this the nucleolus is then uniquely defined as the lexicographically
minimal imputation, see e.g. [46]. For the weighted game [3; 2, 1, 1, 1] the nucleolus is given by
1
5 ·(2, 1, 1, 1), i.e. it coincides with the normalized given weighted representation. The nucleolus
has been proposed as a power index e.g. in [35, 42, 43].
3. (j, k) SIMPLE GAMES
In this section we briefly introduce the concept of (j, k) (simple) games, mainly based on [20].
So let j, k > 2 be two arbitrary integers. By J = {1, . . . , j} we denote the alternative options
in the input and by K = {1, . . . , k} the alternatives in the output. A numeric evaluation (of the
output, i.e. the aggregated group decision) is a function α : K → R with α(i) > α(i + 1) for
all 1 6 i < k. Boolean games, as defined in the previous section, can be seen as (2, 2)-games,
where J = K = {1, 2} and α(1) = 1, α(2) = 0. In the following we assume the uniform numeric
evaluation α(i) = k− i and specify all subsequent definitions without α.
Definition 3.1. A sequence S = (S1, . . . , Sj) of mutually disjoint sets Si ⊆ N with ∪16i6jSi is
called ordered j-partition.
For the binary case j = 2, the set S1 is given by the “yes”-voters and S2 by the “no”-voters.
By JN we denote the set of all ordered j-partitions of N, i.e. we especially have
∣∣JN∣∣ = jn.
An ordered j-partition S = (S1, . . . , Sj) can also be written as a mapping β : N → J, where
Sh = {i ∈ N : β(i) = h} for all 1 6 h 6 j.
Definition 3.2. For two ordered j-partitions S = (S1, . . . , Sj), T = (T1, . . . , Tj) we write S
j
⊆ T
if
∪16h6iSi ⊆ ∪16h6iTi
for all 1 6 i 6 j.
Definition 3.3. A Boolean (j, k) game is given by a function v : JN → Kwith v
(
(∅, . . . , ∅, N)
)
=
k and v((N, ∅, . . . , ∅)
)
= 1.
In other words Definition 3.3 says that if all voters are in favor of the lowest alternative,
then the aggregated group decision should be the lowest alternative and similarly for the highest
alternative.
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Definition 3.4. A (j, k) simple game is a Boolean game v : JN → K such that v(S) 6 v(T) for
all ordered j-partitions S
j
⊆ T .
Let us consider the following example (taken from [15]) of a (3, 2) simple game v given by
v
(
S1, S2, S3
)
= 2 ∀S1 ⊆ N\{1},
v
(
S1, S2, S3
)
= 2 ∀{2, 3} ⊆ S3 ⊆ N,
v
(
S1, S2, S3
)
= 1 ∀{1} ⊆ S1 ⊆ N, |S3 ∩ {2, 3}| 6 1,
where S1, S2, S3 form an ordered 3-partition of N = {1, 2, 3}. In other words the aggregated
group decision is 1 if and only if voter 1 is in favor of alternative 1 and not both of the remaining
voters are in favor of alternative 3.
We remark that there are also notions for complete or weighted (j, k) games, but according to
[18] no completely satisfactory definition of a weighted (j, k) game has been found so far, while
several suggestions have been proposed in the literature.
In order to state the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index for (j, k) simple games, see [18]
and [17], we need a few further definitions.
Definition 3.5. A queue of N = {1, . . . , n} is a bijection from N to N. The set of all queues is
denoted by Qn, i.e. |Qn| = n!.
Definition 3.6. Let v : JN → K be a (j, k) simple game, q ∈ Qn a queue, and S = (S1, . . . , Sj)
an ordered j-partition. For each 1 6 i 6 k− 1 the i-pivot is uniquely defined either as
(1) the voter, whose vote in S clinches the aggregated group decision under, at least the
output level i, independently of the subsequent voters of i in q, or
(2) the voter, whose vote in S clinches the aggregated group decision under, at most the
output level i+ 1, independently of the subsequent voters of i in q.
For the example of the (3, 2) game v above, we consider the queue q = (2, 1, 3) and the or-
dered 3-partition S = ({1}, {2}, {3}). Since v
(
{1, 3}, {2}, ∅) = 1 and v(∅, {2}, {1, 3}) = 2, voter 2
is not a 1-pivot for q and S in v. Since v
(
{1}, {2}, {3}
)
= v
(
{1}, {2, 3}, ∅) = v({1, 3}, {2}, ∅) = 1,
voter 1 is not a 1-pivot for q and S in v and voter 3 is a 1-pivot for q and S in v.
Definition 3.7. The Shapley-Shubik index of a (j, k) simple game is given by
SSIi(v) =
1
n! · jn ·
k−1∑
h=1
∣∣{(q, S) ∈ Qn × JN : i is a h-pivot for q and S in v}∣∣ (4)
for all i ∈ N.
For the stated example of the (3, 2) simple game we obtain the following pivot-counts per
permutation:
(1, 2, 3)→ (18, 6, 3) (2, 1, 3)→ (24, 0, 3) (3, 1, 2)→ (24, 3, 0)
(1, 3, 2)→ (18, 3, 6) (2, 3, 1)→ (24, 0, 3) (3, 2, 1)→ (24, 3, 0)
so that SSI(v) =
(
22
27 ,
5
54 ,
5
54
)
.
Definition 3.8. Given a (j, k) simple game v and an ordered j-partition S ∈ JN, we denote by
Si↓ the unique ordered j partition which satisfies
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(1) Sh\{i} = Th\{i} for all 1 6 h 6 j and
(2) i ∈ Tmax(h+1,j) for the index h with i ∈ Sh,
where we use the abbreviation T = Si↓. The pair (S, Si↓) ∈ JN × JN is called an (m, l)-swing
for voter i if 1 6 l < m 6 k, v(S) = l, and v(T) = m. The number of all (m, l)-swings for
voter i in v is denoted by ηi(v).
Definition 3.9. The absolute Banzhaf index of a (j, k) simple game is given by
BZIi(v) =
1
jn−1 · (k− 1) · ηi(v) (5)
for all i ∈ N.
We remark that the normalization factor 1
jn−1·(k−1) , which is not contained in the definition
stated in [17], is rather debatable, but this way our definitions coincide with the usual definitions
for (2, 2) simple games. In most applications the absolute Banzhaf index is normalized to be
efficient anyway.
For the stated example of the (3, 2) simple game we obtain η1(v) = 8, η2(v) = η3(v) = 1,
so that BZI = 19 · (8, 1, 1) and that the normalized Banzhaf index is given by
(
4
5 ,
1
10 ,
1
10
)
. We
remark that for this specific example the ‖ · ‖1-norm of the difference of the Shapley-Shubik
index and the normalized Banzhaf index is given by 4135 ≈ 3%.
To the best of our knowledge the nucleolus has not been defined for (j, k) simple games so
far. In Section 6 we will extend the definition of the nucleolus of simple games to continuous
decision rules. The underlying, rather natural idea, can be used to define the nucleolus also for
(j, k) simple games.
For the special case of (3, 2) simple games some more power indices were defined in [19].
4. CONTINUOUS DECISION RULES
In order to rewrite the definitions and results of Section 2 for the continuous interval [0, 1]
instead of the binary set {0, 1} of alternatives, we identify 2N with {0, 1}n, i.e. subsets are mapped
to incidence vectors
S ⊆ N 7→ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n,
where xi = 1 if i ∈ S and xi = 0 otherwise. An example is given by the incidence vector
(1, 0, 1, 0) for the coalition {1, 3} ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Definition 4.1. A continuous Boolean game is a function v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]with v((0, . . . , 0)) =
0 and v
(
(1, . . . , 1)
)
= 1. The set of all continuous Boolean games on n players is denoted by
Bn.
We remark that requiring v
(
(x, . . . , x)
)
= x for all x ∈ [0, 1] would be a rather strong
condition, which is violated by several of the examples considered later on.
Each Boolean game v can be embedded in a continuous Boolean game v ′ extending the
function defined on the 2n points {0, 1}n in an arbitrary way. If v is linear, i.e. if v(S ∪ T) =
v(S) + v(T) for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T , then we can use convex combinations of the 2n points
{0, 1}n to interpolate the intermediate points in [0, 1]n. Another way is to use a partition S, T of
[0, 1] in the following way: For each x ′ ∈ [0, 1]n we define x ∈ {0, 1}n by xi = 0 if x ′i ∈ S
and xi = 1 if x ′i ∈ T . With this we can set v ′(x ′) = v(x) ∈ {0, 1}. We remark that using this
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threshold-type embedding the definitions stated in this section are transfered back to those from
Section 2.
Instead of winning and losing coalitions we can look more generally at z-coalitions {i ∈ N |
xi = z}, z-coalitions {i ∈ N | xi 6 z}, and z-coalitions {i ∈ N | xi > z} for each z ∈ [0, 1]. So
winning coalitions are 1-coalitions and losing coalitions are 0-coalitions if all xi are binary.
Definition 4.2. For two vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn and y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn we write
x 6 y if xi 6 yi for all 1 6 i 6 n.
Definition 4.3. A continuous simple game is a continuous Boolean game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]
such that v(S) 6 v(T) for all real-valued vectors 0 6 S 6 T 6 1, where 0 denotes the all-0-
and 1 the all-1-vector. The set of all continuous simple games on n players is denoted by Sn.
Definition 4.4. Given a continuous Boolean v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1], each voter i ∈ N such that
v
(
(x1, . . . , xn)
)
= v
(
(x1, xi−1, x
′
i, xi+1, . . . , xn)
)
for all x1, . . . , xn, x ′i ∈ [0, 1] is called a null voter.
We remark that Definition 4.4 is equivalent to Definition 2.4 if all xi are binary.
Definition 4.5. A continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is called proper if v(x) + v(1 −
x) 6 1 for all real-valued vectors x ∈ [0, 1]n. It is called strong if v(x) + v(1 − x) > 1. A
continuous simple game that is both proper and strong is called constant-sum (or self-dual, or
decisive).
In analogy to Definition 2.6 we generalize Isbell’s desirability relation as follows:
Definition 4.6. Given a continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] we say that voter i ∈ N is
more desirable as voter j ∈ N, denoted by i  j, if
(1) v(τ(x)) > v(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]n with xi 6 xj, where τ is equal to the transposition
(i, j);
(2) v(τ(x)) 6 v(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]n with xi > xj, where τ is equal to the transposition
(i, j).
We write i ' j if i  j, j  i and use i  j as abbreviation for i  j, i 6' j.
We can easily check that Definition 4.6 is equivalent to Definition 2.6 if all xi are binary.
Definition 4.7. A continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is called complete if for each pair
of voters i, j ∈ N we have i  j or j  i. The set of all continuous complete (simple) games on
n voters is denoted by Cn.
As mentioned in the previous section, no completely satisfactory definition of a weighted
(j, k) game has been found so far, so that we propose several versions of weightedness in the
case of continuous simple games.
Definition 4.8. A continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is linearly weighted if there
exist (normalized) weights w1, . . . , wn > 0 with
∑n
i=1wi = 1 such that v
(
(x1, . . . , xn)
)
=∑n
i=1wixi. The set of all continuous linearly weighted (simple) games on n voters is denoted
by Ln.
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Definition 4.9. A continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is called a threshold game if there
exists a quota q ∈ (0, 1] and (normalized) weights w1, . . . , wn > 0 with
∑n
i=1wi = 1 such
that v
(
(x1, . . . , xn)
)
= 1 if
∑n
i=1wixi > q and v
(
(x1, . . . , xn)
)
= 0 otherwise. The set of all
continuous threshold games on n voters is denoted by Tn.
Definition 4.10. A continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is weighted if there exist (nor-
malized) weights w1, . . . , wn > 0 with
∑n
i=1wi = 1 and a monotonously increasing quota
function q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that v((x1, . . . , xn)) = q (∑ni=1wixi). The set of all continu-
ous weighted (simple) games on n voters is denoted by Wn.
The quota function q of a weighted continuous simple game satisfies q(0) = 0 and q(1) = 1.
We remark that all linearly weighted, all threshold, and all weighted continuous simple games
are complete.
Lemma 4.11. The weighted representation of a continuous linearly weighted game is unique.
PROOF. Assume that a given continuous linearly weighted game v has two weighted representa-
tionsw and wˆ withw, wˆ ∈ [0, 1]n and ‖w‖1 = ‖wˆ‖1 = 1. Thus we have v(x) = wTx = wˆTx
for all x ∈ [0, 1]n. Inserting x = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where the 1 is at position 1 6 i 6 n,
yields wi = wˆi, so that w = wˆ. 
Lemma 4.12. Let v be a continuous threshold game such that there exists a vector x 6= 1 with
v(x) = 1 and xj < 1 for a non-null voter j. The weighted representation of v, consisting of a
quota q ∈ (0, 1] and weights w ∈ [0, 1]n with ‖w‖1 = 1, is unique.
PROOF. Let (q(1), w(1)) and (q(2), w(2)) be two representations of v, i.e.
n∑
i=1
w
(1)
i x˜i > q
(1) ⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
w
(2)
i x˜i > q
(2)
for all x˜ ∈ [0, 1]n. Since q(1) ∈ [0, 1] there exists a xˆ ∈ [0, 1]n with xˆTw(1) = q(1). Each
voter 1 6 i 6 n with w(1)i = 0 or w
(2)
i = 0 is a null voter.
Assume q(1) = 1: For x 6= 1 there is a non-null voter 1 6 j 6 n with xj < 1. Thusw(1)j = 0
since otherwise xTw(1) < 1, which is contradictory to j being a non-null voter. Thus we have
q(1) 6= 1.
Next we show that each null voter has zero weight. Let ej denote the j-th unit vector and let
i be a null voter. If xˆi > 0 then w(1)(xˆ− ε · ei) < q(1) for all ε > 0, so that v(xˆ− ε · ei) = 0
(for suitably small ε), which is contradictory to i being a null voter. If otherwise xˆi = 0 for
all null voters i, then there exists a non-null voter j with xˆj > 0 and w
(1)
j > 0. With this
we have w(i)(xˆ − ε · ej) < q(1) for ε > 0 and v(xˆ − ε · ej) = 0 (for suitably small ε).
Since w(1)(xˆ − ε · ej + ε · w
(1)
j
w
(1)
i
· ei) = q(1), where i is an arbitrary null voter, we have
v(xˆ− ε · ej + ε · w
(1)
j
w
(1)
i
· ei) = 1, which contradicts the fact that i is a null voter. Thus each null
voter has zero weight.
Due to symmetry we can state q(1), q(2) ∈ (0, 1), w(1)j , w(2)j ∈ (0, 1] for all non-null voters
j, and w(1)i = w
(2)
i = 0 for all null voters i. If there exists exactly one non-null voter j in v,
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then we have w(1)j = 1 = w
(2)
j due to ‖w(1)‖1 = ‖w(2)‖1 = 1, so that w(1) = w(2). Thus
we assume that the number of non-null voters is at least two and w(1)j , w
(2)
j ∈ (0, 1) for all
non-null voters j in the following.
We have v(xˆ) = 1 and v(xˆ − ε · ej) = 0, where 1 6 j 6 n is a non-null voter and ε > 0
is arbitrary (but suitably small). Thus we have q(2) = q(1). For two arbitrary non-null voters
indices 1 6 j1, j2 6 n and suitably small ε > 0 we have
q(1) = w(1)(xˆ−w
(1)
j2
·ε ·ej1 +w(1)j1 ·ε ·ej2) = w(2)(xˆ−w
(1)
j2
·ε ·ej1 +w(1)j1 ·ε ·ej2) = q(2).
Thus
w
(1)
j1
w
(1)
j2
=
w
(2)
j1
w
(2)
j2
and we conclude w(1) = w(2) from ‖w(1)‖1 = ‖w(2)‖1 = 1 and w(1)i = w(2)i = for the null
voters i. 
For the case of quota q = 1 we remark, that any (normalized) weight vectorw ∈ [0, 1]n leads
to the same continuous threshold game.
Given a finite number k of continuous threshold games v1, . . . , vk we call the game arising
by
v(x) = min
16i6k
{vi(x)}
the intersection of the continuous threshold games vi. v is indeed a continuous simple game, but
not every continuous simple game can be written as a finite intersection of continuous threshold
games. An example is given by the continuous simple game vwith v(x) = 1 if 1n ·
∑n
i=1 x
2
i > 12
and v(x) = 0 otherwise. Here infinitely many continuous threshold games are needed in the
intersection.
Lemma 4.13. The quota function q of a continuous weighted game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is
unique. If q is monotone and continuous, then also the weights wi are unique.
PROOF. Since v(x, . . . , x) = q(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] the quota function is uniquely defined.
Since q(0) = 0, q(1) = 1, q is monotone and continuous, there exists a value x ∈ [0, 1] such
that y = q−1(x) ∈ (0, 1) is uniquely defined. If v(y, . . . , y, y+ ε, y, . . . , y) = v(y, . . . , y) for
ε = min(y, 1 − y)/2 and a modified position 1 6 i 6 n, then wi = 0. For all other positions
we have wj > 0. Let i and j be two positions with wi, wj > 0. For suitably small ε > 0 there
exists a unique δ > 0 such that v(z) = game(y, . . . , y), where zi = y + ε, zj = y − δ, and
zh = y for h 6= i, j. From this we conclude εwi = δwj, so that we can uniquely determine all
wh due to ‖w‖1 = 1. 
So, depending on the chosen definition of weightedness, the corresponding weighted repre-
sentations are either unique or not. For the different versions of weightedness the connection to
the properties proper, strong, and constant-sum is as follows:
Lemma 4.14. All continuous linearly weighted games are proper, strong, and constant-sum.
PROOF. For a given continuous weighted game v let w ∈ [0, 1]n with ‖w‖1 = 1 be suitable
(normalized) weights. With this we have
v(x) + v(1 − x) = wTx+wT (1 − x) = ‖w‖1 = 1
for all x ∈ [0, 1]n. 
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Lemma 4.15. A continuous threshold game v with (normalized) weightsw and quota q ∈ (0, 1]
is proper if and only if q > 12 .
PROOF. Since
v
(
1
2
· 1
)
=
1
2
wT1 = 1−
1
2
wT1 = v
(
1 −
1
2
· 1
)
the game v is non-proper for q 6 12 . Now assume q >
1
2 . We have v(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all
x ∈ [0, 1]n. Assume that both v(x) = 1 and v(1 − x) = 1. Then we would have wTx > q and
wT (1 − x) > q so that
1 = ‖w‖1 > 2q,
which is a contradiction to q > 12 . 
Lemma 4.16. A continuous threshold game v with (normalized) weightsw and quota q ∈ (0, 1]
is strong if and only if q 6 12 .
PROOF. Since
v
(
1
2
· 1
)
=
1
2
wT1 = 1−
1
2
wT1 = v
(
1 −
1
2
· 1
)
the game v is non-strong for q > 12 . Now assume q 6
1
2 . We have v(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all
x ∈ [0, 1]n. Assume that both v(x) = 0 and v(1 − x) = 0. Then we would have wTx < q and
wT (1 − x) < q so that
1 = ‖w‖1 < 2q,
which is a contradiction to q 6 12 . 
Corollary 4.17. No continuous threshold game can be constant-sum.
Lemma 4.18. A continuous weighted game v with (normalized) weights w and quota function
q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is proper if and only if q(y) + q(1− y) 6 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
PROOF. For arbitrary x ∈ [0, 1]n we have
v(x) + v(1 − x) = q(wTx) + q(wT (1 − x)) = q(y) + q(1− y) 6 1,
where y = wTx ∈ [0, 1]. 
Lemma 4.19. A continuous weighted game v with (normalized) weights w and quota function
q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is strong if and only if q(y) + q(1− y) > 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
PROOF. For arbitrary x ∈ [0, 1]n we have
v(x) + v(1 − x) = q(wTx) + q(wT (1 − x)) = q(y) + q(1− y) > 1,
where y = wTx ∈ [0, 1]. 
Corollary 4.20. A continuous weighted game v with (normalized) weightsw and quota function
q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is constant-sum if and only if q(y) + q(1− y) = 1 for all y ∈ [0, 1].
The notion of a power index can be transfered as follows:
Definition 4.21. Let Vn ⊆ Bn a class of continuous Boolean games consisting of n voters. A
power index (on Vn) is a mapping P : Vn → Rn.
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The four properties of power indices for subclasses of Boolean games, see Definition 2.14,
can be restated one to one for power indices for subclasses of continuous Boolean games.
Before we give definitions for the Shapley-Shubik index, the absolute Banzhaf index and
the nucleolus for continuous simple games in Section 6, we discuss some special classes of
continuous games in the next section.
5. EXAMPLES OF CONTINUOUS GAMES
The definitions of linearly weighted, threshold, and weighted continuous simple games in the
previous section allow a compact representation of those games given a weight vector w and
eventually a quota or quota function q.
Numerous theoretical models for the behavior of politicians are based on the so-called median
voter model, see e.g. [10, 11, 41, 45]. The median voter theorem states that in a voting system
with a single majority decision rule, the most probable elected alternative is the one which is
most preferred by the median voter. The key assumptions of a 1-dimensional policy space with
single peaked preferences are met in our context. So similarly to Hotelling’s law, according
to the median voter model, politicians try to adjust their opinions near the preferences of the
expected median voter. In practice there are several limitations for the median voter theorem so
that the explanatory power of the median voter model is actually rather low, see e.g. [48].
In our context the situation is a bit easier. Given the single peaked preferences xi ∈ [0, 1]
of the voters, the aggregated group decision can be any number in [0, 1], i.e. we neither have to
choose within a finite number of alternatives nor do we indirectly influence future decisions by
electing a representative. So it makes quite some sense to utilize the median aggregation rule
given by
v(x1, . . . , xn) =
{
xpi(n+12 )
: n ≡ 1 (mod 2),
1
2 · xpi(n2 ) +
1
2 · xpi(n+22 ) : n ≡ 0 (mod 2),
(6)
where pi is a permutation such that xpi(1) 6 · · · 6 xpi(n). This decision rule can be slightly
generalized by introducing non-negative weights wi for all voters 1 6 i 6 n such that ‖w‖1 =∑n
i=1wi > 0. With a permutation pi as before, let i be the smallest index such that
∑i
j=1wpi(j) >
‖w‖1/2. Similarly, let i be the largest index such that
∑n
j=iwpi(j) > ‖w‖1/2. If i = i we set
v(x1, . . . , xn) = xpi(i) and v(x1, . . . , xn) =
(
xpi(i) + xpi(i)
)
/2 otherwise. We call this proce-
dure the weighted median aggregation rule.
And indeed, continuous games (without our more general notion) equipped with the weighted
median aggregation rule are e.g. studied in [37, 38, 39, 44]. We will see that some formulas
for power indices, defined in the subsequent sections, can be significantly simplified for the
(weighted) median aggregation rule.
Another source of group aggregation rules is the field of opinion dynamics. Assume that each
voter starts with an initial opinion xi ∈ [0, 1] followed by a dynamic process of exchanging
opinions between the individuals. Such a opinion dynamics influences the initial opinions in a
certain way, so that the opinion x ′i, after some rounds of interaction, may significantly differ from
the initial ones. Group aggregation for the final opinions x ′i may be performed using weighted
voting or the median aggregation rule. Several models for opinion dynamics, i.e. specifications
how the xi are modified to the x ′i have been proposed in the literature. Here we only mention
the Lehrer-Wagner model, see e.g. [36], the bounded confidence model, see e.g. [25], model
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based on opinion leaders, see e.g. [31, 51], and the more recent models proposed by Grabisch
and Rusinowska [24, 22, 23, 40, 21] (being based on the ground of [26]). An overview of social
and economic networks is given in [29].
6. GENERALIZING THREE POWER INDICES
In this section we propose generalizations of the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index and
the nucleolus for continuous simple games, which are, in a certain sense, in line with the defi-
nitions for simple games or (j, k)-simple games. We illustrate our definitions by computing the
respective indices for the functions vˆ(x1, x2, x3) =
1x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 and v˜(x1, x2, x3) = x1x
2
2x
3
3.
6.1. Shapley-Shubik index. One interpretation for the definition of the Shapley-Shubik index
for simple games is the following:
(1) According to the veil of ignorance, the set of vote vectors has no structure, i.e. votes are
independent and each of the 2n {0, 1}-vectors occurs with equal probability.
(2) Assume that the voters are arranged in a sequence and called one by one. After the
ith voter in the current sequence has expressed his vote, an output alternative may be
excluded independently from the votes of the subsequent voters. Here all sequences are
equally probable and the exclusion of an output alternative is counted just once, i.e. it is
counted for the first player who excludes it.
Going along the same lines for (j, k) simple games, we have jn possible input vectors in (1)
and n! possible sequences in (2). The notion of an i-pivot in Definition 3.6 exactly determines
the voter who excludes output alternative i or i + 1, where we have to consider the direction of
the exclusion to avoid double counting.
Lets look at the highest and the lowest possible outcome of a (j, k) simple game v given the
first i votes x1, . . . , xi. Due to monotonicity the highest possible outcome occurs if the remain-
ing n − i voters vote for the highest possible (input) alternative. Similarly, the lowest possible
outcome occurs if the remaining n− i voters vote for the lowest possible (input) alternative. For
continuous simple games the extremal input alternatives are given by 0 and 1 so that we define:
Definition 6.1.
• τ : [0, 1]n × {1, . . . , n} → [0, 1]n, (x, i) 7→ (y1, . . . , yn), where yj = xj for all
1 6 j 6 i and yj = 1 otherwise;
• τ : [0, 1]n × {1, . . . , n} → [0, 1]n, (x, i) 7→ (y1, . . . , yn), where yj = xj for all
1 6 j 6 i and yj = 0 otherwise.
With this we can count the number of excluded output alternatives and sum over all possible
sequences and vote distributions. Since the output interval [0, 1] is continuous, counting here
means to measure the length of the newly excluded interval. There are n! < ∞ possible se-
quences of the n voters, so that summing here really means summing up. Since the space [0, 1]n
of possible vote distributions is continuous we have to utilize integrals:
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Definition 6.2. Let v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be a continuous simple game. The Shapley-Shubik index
SSIi(v) of voter i in v is given by
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Sn
∫1
0
. . .
∫1
0
(
v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i) − 1
))
− v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i)
)) )
+
(
v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i)
))
− v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i) − 1
)) )
d x1 . . . d xn,
where Sn denotes the symmetric group on n elements, i.e. the set of permutations or bijections
from {1, . . . , n} to {1, . . . , n}.
For our two examples we obtain
SSI(vˆ) =
(
1
6
,
2
6
,
3
6
)
=
(
0.16, 0.3, 0.5
)
and
SSI(v˜) =
(
35
144
,
50
144
,
59
144
)
=
(
0.24305, 0.3472, 0.40972
)
.
The detailed computations are stated in Appendix A.
While the story of interpreting the Shapley-Shubik index, stated at the beginning of this sec-
tion, may be considered to be nice, more serious characterizations involve a so-called axiomati-
zation, see e.g. [12]:
Lemma 6.3. Let P : Sn → Rn be a power index. If P satisfies symmetry, efficiency, the null
voter property, and the transfer axiom, then P coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index.
In order to define the transfer axiom for simple games we need:
Definition 6.4. For two Boolean games v1, v2 ∈ Sn we define v1 ∨ v2 by (v1 ∨ v2) (S) =
max (v1(S), v2(S)) for all S ⊆ N. Similarly, we define v1∧v2 by (v1 ∧ v2) (S) = min (v1(S), v2(S)).
Definition 6.5. A power index P : Vn → Rn satisfies the transfer axiom, if
P(v1) + P(v2) = P(v1 ∧ v2) + P(v1 ∨ v2)
for all v1, v2 ∈ Vn such that also (v1 ∧ v2) , (v1 ∨ v2) ∈ Vn, where Vn is a subclass of
(binary) Boolean games.
Definition 6.5 can be restated directly for continuous Boolean games using:
Definition 6.6. For two continuous Boolean games v1, v2 we define v1∨v2 by (v1 ∨ v2) (x) =
max (v1(x), v2(x)) for all x ∈ [0, 1]n. Similarly, we define v1 ∧ v2 by (v1 ∧ v2) (x) =
min (v1(x), v2(x)).
If v1, v2 ∈ Sn, then also (v1 ∧ v2) , (v1 ∨ v2) ∈ Sn. Directly from the definitions we
conclude:
Lemma 6.7. The Shapley-Shubik index SSI is symmetric, positive, and satisfies both the null
voter property and the transfer axiom on Sn.
Conjecture 6.8. The Shapley-Shubik index for continuous simple games is efficient, i.e.
∑n
i=1 SSIi(v) =
1 for all v ∈ Sn.
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Conjecture 6.9. Let P : Sn → Rn be a power index. If P satisfies symmetry, efficiency, the null
voter property, and the transfer axiom, then P coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index according
to Definition 6.2.
As remarked before, the formula for the Shapley-Shubik index can be simplified for the
weighted median aggregation rule. To this end let w ∈ Rn>0 be a weight vector with ‖w‖1 > 0.
To avoid technical difficulties we assume
∑
i∈Swi 6= ‖w‖1/2 for all S ⊆ N, i.e. that there is
always a unique weighted median voter. Without proof we state:
Lemma 6.10. The Shapley-Shubik index of the weighted median aggregation rule, according to
Definition 6.2 is given by the Shapley-Shubik index of the weighted game [‖w‖1/2;w1, . . . , wn].
We give an example in Appendix B.
6.2. Banzhaf index. One interpretation for the definition of the Banzhaf index for simple games
and (j, k) simple games is the following:
(1) According to the veil of ignorance, the set of vote vectors has no structure, i.e. votes are
independent and each of the jn J-vectors occurs with equal probability.
(2) Relevant for the measurement of influence is only the number of (m, l)-swings (or
swings for simple games) for voter i arising if voter i shifts his chosen alternative by
one.
For continuous simple games the votes of the voters in N\{i} are equally distributed in
[0, 1]n−1, so that we have to use an (n − 1)-fold integral. The counting of (m, l)-swings for
the different possible shifts of the opinion of voter 1 can be condensed to a single expression:
Given an ordered j-partition S, we denote by S the j-partition arising from S by setting the vote
of voters i to alternative 1. Similarly, we denote by S the j-partition arising from S by setting
the vote of voters i to alternative k. Then v(S) − v(S) counts the number of (m, l)-swings for
voter i given the preferences of the other voters in N\{i}. By dividing by k − 1 this number
is contained in [0, 1]. For continuous simple games the lowest possible alternative is 0 and the
highest possible alternative is 1, so that:
Definition 6.11. Let v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be a continuous simple game. The (absolute) Banzhaf
index BZIi(v) of voter i in v is given by∫1
0
. . .
∫1
0
(
v(x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , n) − v(x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , n)
)
d x1 . . . d xi−1 d xi+1 . . . d xn.
For the two continuous simple games, introduced at the beginning of this section, we obtain:
BZI1(vˆ) =
∫1
0
∫1
0
(
1+ 2x22 + 3x
3
3
6
−
0+ 2x22 + 3x
3
3
6
)
d x2 d x3 =
1
6
BZI2(vˆ) =
∫1
0
∫1
0
(
1x1 + 2+ 3x
3
3
6
−
1x11 + 0+ 3x
3
3
6
)
d x1 d x3 =
2
6
BZI3(vˆ) =
∫1
0
∫1
0
(
1x21 + 2x
2
2 + 3
6
−
1x21 + 2x
2
2 + 0
6
)
d x1 d x2 =
3
6
Since BZI1(vˆ) + BZI2(vˆ) + BZI3(vˆ) = 1 no normalization is necessary.
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BZI1(v˜) =
∫1
0
∫1
0
(
x22x
3
3 − 0
)
d x2 d x3 =
1
12
BZI2(v˜) =
∫1
0
∫1
0
(
x1x
3
3 − 0
)
d x1 d x3 =
1
8
BZI3(v˜) =
∫1
0
∫1
0
(
x1x
2
2 − 0
)
d x1 d x2 =
1
6
After normalization we obtain 19 · (2, 3, 4) =
(
0.2, 0.3, 0.4
)
for the (relative) Banzhaf index.
An axiomatization of the Banzhaf index for simple games was e.g. be given in [13]:
Lemma 6.12. Let P : Sn → Rn be a power index. If P satisfies symmetry, the null voter
property, the transfer axiom, and the Banzhaf total power, then P coincides with the Banzhaf
index.
Definition 6.13. A power index P : Vn → Rn satisfies Banzhaf total power, if
n∑
i=1
BZIi(v) =
1
2n−1
·
n∑
i=1
∑
S⊆N\{i}
(
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S))
for all v ∈ Vn, where Vn is a subclass of (binary) Boolean games.
Definition 6.13 can be restated directly for continuous Boolean games:
Definition 6.14. A power index P : Vn → Rn satisfies Banzhaf total power, if ‖BZI(v)‖1
coincides with
n∑
i=1
∫1
0
. . .
∫1
0
(
v(x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , n) − v(x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , n)
)
d x1 . . . d xi−1 d xi+1 . . . d xn.
for all v ∈ Vn, where Vn is a subclass of continuous Boolean games.
Directly from the definitions we conclude:
Lemma 6.15. The Banzhaf index BZI is symmetric, positive, and satisfies the null voter property,
the transfer axiom, and Banzhaf total power on Sn.
Conjecture 6.16. Let P : Sn → Rn be a power index. If P satisfies symmetry, the null voter
property, the transfer axiom, and the Banzhaf total power, then P coincides with the Banzhaf
index according to Definition 6.11.
6.3. Nucleolus.
Definition 6.17. Given a continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] and a vector w ∈ [0, 1]n
with ‖w‖1 = 1, the excess of a coalition x ∈ [0, 1]n is given by ev(x,w) = v(x) − wTx ∈
[−1, 1].
The excess vector for the case of simple games is generalized to:
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Definition 6.18. Given a continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] and a vector w ∈ [0, 1]n
with ‖w‖1 = 1, the excess function is given by Evw : [−1, 1]→ [0, 1],
c 7→ vol ({x ∈ [0, 1]n : v(x) −wTx > c}) ,
where vol(S) denotes the n-dimensional volume of a subset S ⊆ Rn. (Here we assume that the
mapping v is regular enough, e.g. piecewise continuous, so that those volumes exist.)
Instead of the lexicographic ordering for two excess vectors we define:
Definition 6.19. For two integrable functions f1 : [−1, 1]→ [0, 1] and f2 : [−1, 1]→ [0, 1], we
write f1 6 f2 if there exists a constant c ∈ [−1, 1] such that f1(y) 6 f2(y) for all y ∈ [c, 1]
and
∫1
c f1(y) dy <
∫1
c f2(y) dy.
Definition 6.20. For a continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] the nucleolus Nuc(v) is
given by
{w ∈ [0, 1]n : ‖w‖1 = 1, Evw 6 Evwˆ ∀wˆ ∈ [0, 1]n : ‖wˆ‖1 = 1} .
Conjecture 6.21. Under mild technical assumptions for a continuous simple game v : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1], we have |Nuc(v)| 6 1.
By definition the elements of the nucleolus are positive and efficient. Of course we also want
to compute the nucleolus for our two examples. Unfortunately we have no general algorithm
at hand, which is capable of solving the optimization problem stated in Definition 6.20. For vˆ
we can compute the nucleolus to be 16 · (1, 2, 3), i.e. it coincides with the Shapley-Shubik and
the Banzhaf index, using a tailored analysis in Appendix C. For v˜ things seem to be much more
complicated without the aid of theoretical results. For the similar two-voter example v(x1, x2) =
x1x
2
2 we compute numeric bounds for the elements in the nucleolus in Appendix C.
7. POWER INDICES WHEN VOTES ARE NOT EQUIPROBABLE
Both the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index for simple games, (j, k) simple games,
or continuous simple games are based on the assumption that voters vote independently from
each other and that they choose each alternative with equal probability. The first assumption is
clearly violated in several practical contexts. Here we restrict ourselves to situations where this
assumption is still met. An equal probability for all possible input alternatives makes a certain
sense for (binary) simple games. Here one can have in mind that the roles of the alternatives are
swapped if the proposal is logically negated. As argued in e.g. [14], for the special case of (3, 2)
simple games, where the central alternative is abstention, things are quite different. In some
real-world legislatures, where abstention is allowed, the rate of abstention is rather low, while in
others it is considerably higher. For the Banzhaf index different probabilities for the two options
were e.g. considered in [30].
For continuous simple games we model this more general situation by assuming a density
function fi, i.e. fi : [0, 1] → R>0 with
∫1
0 fi(x) d x = 1, for each voter i ∈ N. With this we
propose:
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Definition 7.1. Let v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be a continuous simple game. The density Shapley-
Shubik index SSIfi(v) of voter i in v is given by
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Sn
∫1
0
. . .
∫1
0
((
v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i) − 1
))
− v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i)
)) )
+
(
v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i)
))
− v
(
τ
(
x, pi−1(i) − 1
)) )) · f1(x1) . . . fn(xn) d x1 . . . d xn,
where Sn denotes the symmetric group on n elements, i.e. the set of permutations or bijections
from {1, . . . , n} to {1, . . . , n} and f = (f1, . . . , fn) is a vector of density functions.
For the special case of the weighted median aggregation rule this definition was (in its sim-
plified version) e.g. used in [33]. As a small example we consider the median aggregation rule
for a continuous simple game v with three voters and density functions, which are given by
f1(x) =
3
4
· (1− x2) ,
f2(x) =
3
8
· (1+ x2) , and
f3(x) =
3
8
· (1+ x2) ,
for x ∈ [−1, 1] and zero otherwise. We can easily check that the three stated functions are indeed
density functions. With this we have
SSIf1(v) =
∫1
−1
∫x1
−1
∫1
x1
f(x) d x2, d x3 d x1 +
∫1
−1
∫x1
−1
∫1
x1
f(x) d x3, d x2 d x1
=
554
13440
≈ 0.04122
SSIf2(v) =
∫1
−1
∫x2
−1
∫1
x2
f(x) d x1, d x3 d x2 +
∫1
−1
∫x2
−1
∫1
x2
f(x) d x3, d x1 d x2
=
563
13440
≈ 0.04189
SSIf3(v) =
∫1
−1
∫x3
−1
∫1
x3
f(x) d x1, d x2 d x3 +
∫1
−1
∫x3
−1
∫1
x3
f(x) d x2, d x1 d x3
=
563
13440
≈ 0.04189
where we use the abbreviation f(x) = f1(x1) · f2(x2) · f3(x3).
Definition 7.2. Let v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be a continuous simple game. The density (absolute)
Banzhaf index BZIfi(v) of voter i in v is given by∫1
0
. . .
∫1
0
(
v(x1, . . . , xi−1, 1, xi+1, . . . , n) − v(x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , n)
)
·f1(x1) . . . fi−1(xi−1) · fi+1(xi+1) . . . fn(xn) d x1 . . . d xi−1 d xi+1 . . . d xn,
where f = (f1, . . . , fn) is a vector of density functions.
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8. CONCLUSION
Measurement of voting power is relevant in many practical applications. The widely used
binary voting model does not fit for several economic problems like e.g. tax rates or spending.
Here we have proposed some definitions for continuous games and highlighted their similarity
to the corresponding definitions for simple or (j, k) simple games. Some first few assertions,
known to be true for simple games, are proven to be valid for our new generalized definitions.
We do not claim that we have found the ultimate truth, but want to stimulate the research for
the right generalization by presenting our educated guess. It is a major task for the future, to
transfer known results for simple games for continuous simple games and eventually modify our
definitions if they do not seem to fit well for a majority of those results. The possibly weakest
part of our suggestions are the generalizations of weightedness. But here the situation even has
not been resolved convincingly for (j, k) simple games. A good benchmark for the proposed
definitions of certain properties for simple, (j, k) simple, and continuous simple games would
be, if the version for simple games arises as a specialization to (2, 2) simple games, and the
version for continuous simple games arises by taking the limit j, k→∞.
For three power indices from cooperative game theory we have proposed generalizations for
continuous simple games and started to study their properties. A litmus test might be to check
whether those defined power indices can be axiomatized in a similar fashion than their binary
counterparts. For the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index we have conjectured such axioma-
tizations. The key to a possible proof of those conjectures might be a generalized definition of
unanimity games.
We have illustrated our generalized power indices by computing the respective values for
several examples. For some parameterized classes of such examples it is indeed possible to
write down easy formulas, which will be delayed to a more technical follow-up paper. For the
proposed generalization of the nucleolus even an algorithmic way to compute the corresponding
set is missing. Maybe it makes also sense to consider generalizations for other of the known
power indices for simple games.
We really hope that this paper can partially contribute to the development of a unified frame-
work for measuring decision power and stimulates further research in that direction.
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APPENDIX A. DETERMINING THE SSI FOR TWO CONTINOUUS SIMPLE GAMES
For the two continuous simple games vˆ and v˜ from Section 6 we compute the Shapley-Shubik
indices. In tables 1-3 we give the respective summands for each permutation pi ∈ S3 for vˆ.
Summarizing the results we obtain
SSI(vˆ) =
(
1
6
,
2
6
,
3
6
)
.
In tables 4-6 we give the respective summands for each permutation pi ∈ S3 for v˜. Summa-
rizing the results we obtain
SSI(v˜) =
(
35
144
,
50
144
,
59
144
)
=
(
0.24305, 0.3472, 0.40972
)
.
APPENDIX B. DETERMINING THE SSI FOR A WEIGHTED MEDIAN AGGREGATION RULE
In order to illustrate Lemma 6.10 we compute the Shapley-Shubik index of a continuous
simple voting game, which is given as the weighted median. We consider a case of 4 voters
with weights 5, 3, 2, 1. The situation may be described as weighted binary game [6; 5, 3, 2, 1] =
[3; 2, 1, 1, 1], so that we may also consider the weights 2, 1, 1, and 1. Since no subset of the
weights sums to exactly half of the weight sum the median is uniquely determined in every case.
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pi ∈ S3 3-fold integral
(1, 2, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
6
6 −
x21+5
6 +
x21
6 −
0
6
)
d x = 16
(1, 3, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
6
6 −
x21+5
6 +
x21
6 −
0
6
)
d x = 16
(2, 1, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
2x22+4
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2
6 −
2x22
6
)
d x = 16
(2, 3, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
2x22+3x
2
3+1
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 −
2x22+3x
2
3
6
)
d x = 16
(3, 1, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
3x23+3
6 −
x21+3x
2
3+2
6 +
x21+3x
2
3
6 −
3x23
6
)
d x = 16
(3, 2, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
2x22+3x
2
3+1
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 −
2x22+3x
2
3
6
)
d x = 16
TABLE 1. SSI1(vˆ) for vˆ(x1, x2, x3) = 16 · (1x21 + 2x22 + 3x23).
pi ∈ S3 3-fold integral
(2, 1, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
6
6 −
x22+4
6 +
x22
6 −
0
6
)
d x = 26
(2, 3, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
6
6 −
x22+4
6 +
x22
6 −
0
6
)
d x = 26
(1, 2, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x21+5
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2
6 −
x21
6
)
d x = 26
(3, 2, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
3x23+3
6 −
2x22+3x
2
3+1
6 +
2x22+3x
2
3
6 −
3x23
6
)
d x = 26
(1, 3, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x21+3x
2
3+2
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 −
x21+3x
2
3
6
)
d x = 26
(3, 1, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x21+3x
2
3+2
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 −
x21+3x
2
3
6
)
d x = 26
TABLE 2. SSI2(vˆ) for vˆ(x1, x2, x3) = 16 · (1x21 + 2x22 + 3x23).
One can easily compute that SSI([3; 2, 1, 1, 1]) =
(
1
2 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
)
. In the subsequent subsections
we will compute the Shapley-Shubik index directly using Definition 6.2, which is indeed a
somewhat lengthy computation.
B.1. Shapley-Shubik power for voter 2.
B.1.1. pi ∈
{
(2, 1, 3, 4), (2, 1, 4, 3), (2, 3, 1, 4), (2, 3, 4, 1), (2, 4, 1, 3), (2, 4, 3, 1)
}
: For permu-
tations pi, where pi(1) = 2, we have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
= 1, v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
= 1, v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
=
0, and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
= 0, so that the value of the 4-fold integral is given by 0.
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pi ∈ S3 3-fold integral
(3, 1, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
6
6 −
3x23+3
6 +
3x23
6 −
0
6
)
d x = 36
(3, 2, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
6
6 −
3x23+3
6 +
3x23
6 −
0
6
)
d x = 36
(1, 3, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x21+5
6 −
x21+3x
2
3+2
6 +
x21+3x
2
3
6 −
x21
6
)
d x = 36
(2, 3, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
2x22+4
6 −
2x22+3x
2
3+1
6 +
2x22+3x
2
3
6 −
2x22
6
)
d x = 36
(1, 2, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x21+2x
2
2+3
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 −
x21+2x
2
2
6
)
d x = 36
(2, 1, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x21+2x
2
2+3
6 −
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 +
x21+2x
2
2+3x
2
3
6 −
x21+2x
2
2
6
)
d x = 36
TABLE 3. SSI3(vˆ) for vˆ(x1, x2, x3) = 16 · (1x21 + 2x22 + 3x23).
pi ∈ S3 3-fold integral
(1, 2, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(1− x1 + 0− 0) d x = 12
(1, 3, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(1− x1 + 0− 0) d x = 12
(2, 1, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x22 − x1x
2
2 + 0− 0
)
d x = 16
(2, 3, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x33 − x1x
3
3 + 0− 0
)
d x = 18
(3, 1, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x22x
3
3 − x1x
2
2x
3
3 + x1x
2
2x
3
3 − 0
)
d x = 112
(3, 2, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x22x
3
3 − x1x
2
2x
3
3 + x1x
2
2x
3
3 − 0
)
d x = 112
TABLE 4. SSI1(v˜) for v˜(x1, x2, x3) = x1x22x
3
3.
B.1.2. pi ∈
{
(3, 2, 1, 4), (3, 2, 4, 1), (4, 2, 1, 3), (4, 2, 3, 1)
}
: For permutations pi, where pi(2) =
2 and pi(1) 6= 1, we have v (τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)) = 1, v (τ(x, pi−1(2))) = 1, v (τ(x, pi−1(2))) =
0, and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
= 0, so that the value of the 4-fold integral is given by 0.
B.1.3. pi = (1, 2, 3, 4), pi = (1, 2, 4, 3): For the permutations pi = (1, 2, 3, 4) and pi = (1, 2, 4, 3)
we have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
= 1 and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
= 0. If x1 6 x2 then v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
=
x2 and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
= x1. Similarly, if I x1 > x2 then v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
= x1 and
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
= x2. Thus for these two permutations the value of the 4-fold integral is given
by ∫1
0
(
1−
(∫x2
0
x2 d x1 +
∫1
x2
x1 d x1
)
+
(∫x2
0
x1 d x1 +
∫1
x2
x2 d x1
)
− 0
)
d x2
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pi ∈ S3 3-fold integral
(1, 2, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x1 − x1x
2
2 + 0− 0
)
d x = 13
(1, 3, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x1x
3
3 − x1x
2
2x
3
3 + x1x
2
2x
3
3 − 0
)
d x = 18
(2, 1, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
1− x22 + 0− 0
)
d x = 23
(2, 3, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
1− x22 + 0− 0
)
d x = 23
(3, 1, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x1x
3
3 − x1x
2
2x
3
3 + x1x
2
2x
3
3 − 0
)
d x = 18
(3, 2, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x33 − x
2
2x
3
3 + 0− 0
)
d x = 16
TABLE 5. SSI2(v˜) for v˜(x1, x2, x3) = x1x22x
3
3.
pi ∈ S3 3-fold integral
(1, 2, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x1x
2
2 − x1x
2
2x
3
3 + x1x
2
2x
3
3 − 0
)
d x = 16
(1, 3, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x1 − x1x
3
3 + 0− 0
)
d x = 38
(2, 1, 3)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x1x
2
2 − x1x
2
2x
3
3 + x1x
2
2x
3
3 − 0
)
d x = 16
(2, 3, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
x22 − x
2
2x
3
3 + 0− 0
)
d x = 14
(3, 1, 2)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
1− x33 + 0− 0
)
d x = 34
(3, 2, 1)
∫
x∈[0,1]3
(
1− x33 + 0− 0
)
d x = 34
TABLE 6. SSI3(v˜) for v˜(x1, x2, x3) = x1x22x
3
3.
=
∫1
0
1
2
+ x2(1− x2) d x2 =
2
3
(7)
B.1.4. pi ∈
{
(1, 3, 2, 4), (1, 4, 2, 3), (3, 1, 2, 4), (4, 1, 2, 3)
}
: For the permutation pi = (1, 3, 2, 4)
we consider the six different strict orderings of x1, x2, and x3 in Table 7. The respective integrals
over x1, x3, and x4 are stated in Table 8.
Summing the right hand sides of the rows of Table 8 and integrating over x2 ∈ [0, 1] yields∫1
0
1
6
d x2 =
1
6
. (8)
Due to symmetry we obtain the same value for pi = (1, 4, 2, 3), pi = (3, 1, 2, 4), and pi =
(4, 1, 2, 3).
MEASURING VOTING POWER IN CONVEX POLICY SPACES 27
ordering v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
x1<x2<x3 x3 x2 x1 x1
x1<x3<x2 x3 x3 x1 x1
x2<x1<x3 x3 x1 x1 x1
x2<x3<x1 x1 x1 x3 x3
x3<x1<x2 x1 x1 x1 x3
x3<x2<x1 x1 x1 x2 x3
TABLE 7. Values of v for pi = (1, 3, 2, 4).
ordering
∫
(x1,x3,x4)
?
x1 < x2 < x3
∫x2
0
∫1
x2
(x3 − x2 + x1 − x1) d x3 d x1 =
x32−2x
2
2+x2
2
x1 < x3 < x2
∫x2
0
∫x2
x1
(x3 − x3 + x1 − x1) d x3 d x1 = 0
x2 < x1 < x3
∫1
x2
∫1
x1
(x3 − x1 + x1 − x1) d x3 d x1 =
−x32+3x
2
2−3x2+1
6
x2 < x3 < x1
∫1
x2
∫1
x3
(x1 − x1 + x3 − x3) d x1 d x3 = 0
x3 < x1 < x2
∫x2
0
∫x2
x3
(x1 − x1 + x1 − x3) d x1 d x3 =
x32
6
x3 < x2 < x1
∫x2
0
∫1
x2
(x1 − x1 + x2 − x3) d x1 d x3 =
x22−x
3
2
2
TABLE 8. Auxiliary integrals for pi = (1, 3, 2, 4).
B.1.5. pi = (3, 4, 2, 1), pi = (4, 3, 2, 1): For the permutations pi = (3, 4, 2, 1) and pi = (4, 3, 2, 1)
we have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
= 1, v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
= max(x2, x3, x4), v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
=
0, and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
= min(x2, x3, x4). Thus for these two permutations the value of the
4-fold integral is given by∫1
0
∫1
0
∫1
0
(1− max(x2, x3, x4) + min(x2, x3, x4)) d x2 d x3 d x4 =
1
2
. (9)
B.1.6. pi ∈
{
(1, 3, 4, 2), (1, 4, 3, 2), (3, 1, 4, 2), (4, 1, 3, 2), (3, 4, 1, 2), (4, 3, 1, 2)
}
: For permu-
tations pi with pi(4) = 2, we consider the three cases whether the maximum and minimum of
x1, x3, x4 is equal to x1 or another number. The respective values of v are stated in Table 9,
where we use the abbreviation x ′ = (x1, x3, x4).
By looking at the 24 strict orderings of x1, x2, x3, x4 we compute the 4-fold to be 16 . (For 4
orderings we obtain a value of 160 , for 12 orderings a value of
1
120 , and for 8 orderings a value
of 0.)
B.1.7. Summarizing the 24 permutations for SSI2(v).
SSI2(v) =
1
4!
·
(
6 · 0+ 4 · 0+ 2 · 2
3
+ 4 · 1
6
+ 2 · 1
2
+ 6 · 1
6
)
=
4
24
=
1
6
.
B.2. Shapley-Shubik power for voter 3 and voter 4. Since voters 3 and 4 behave as voter 2,
i.e. they are symmetric, in the weighted median, we obtain SSI3(v) = SSI4(v) = 16 .
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max x ′ min x ′ v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
x1 6= x1 x1
{
max(x2, x3, x4) : x2 6 x1
x1 : x2 > x1
6= x1 x1 min(x3, x4) min(x2, x3, x4)
6= x1 6= x1 x1 x1
max x ′ min x ′ v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2))
)
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(2) − 1)
)
x1 6= x1 max(x2, x3, x4) max(x3, x4)
6= x1 x1
{
min(x2, x3, x4) : x2 > x1
x1 : x2 6 x1
x1
6= x1 6= x1 x1 x1
TABLE 9. Values of v for permutations pi with pi(4) = 2.
B.3. Shapley-Shubik power for voter 1. Assuming Conjecture 6.8 we would obtain
SSI1(v) = 1− SSI2(v) − SSI3(v) − SSI4(v) =
1
2
.
By an computation analogue to Subsection B.1 we can confirm this value directly. For com-
pleteness we give the entire calculation below.
B.3.1. pi ∈
{
(1, 2, 3, 4), (1, 2, 4, 3), (1, 3, 2, 4), (1, 3, 4, 2), (1, 4, 2, 3), (1, 4, 3, 2)
}
: For permu-
tations pi, where pi(1) = 1, we have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
= 1, v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= 1, v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
=
0, and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
= 0, so that the value of the 4-fold integral is given by 0.
B.3.2. pi ∈
{
(2, 1, 3, 4), (2, 1, 4, 3), (3, 1, 2, 4), (3, 1, 4, 2), (4, 1, 2, 3), (4, 1, 3, 2)
}
: For permu-
tation pi = (2, 1, 3, 4) we consider the two cases x2 6 x1 and x2 > x1. In both cases
we have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
= 1 and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
= 0. For x2 6 x1 we have
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= x1 and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= x2. For x2 > x1 we have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
=
x2 and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= x1. Thus the corresponding 4-fold integral is given by∫1
0
(
1−
(∫x1
0
x1 d x2 +
∫1
x1
x2 d x2
)
+
(∫x1
0
x2 d x2 +
∫1
x1
x1 d x2
)
− 0
)
d x1
=
∫1
0
(
1
2
+ x1(1− x1)
)
d x1 =
2
3
. (10)
Due to symmetry we obtain the same values for all permutations pi with pi(2) = 1.
B.3.3. pi ∈
{
(2, 3, 1, 4), (3, 2, 1, 4), (2, 4, 1, 3), (4, 2, 1, 3), (3, 4, 1, 2), (4, 3, 1, 2)
}
: For permu-
tation pi = (2, 3, 1, 4) we consider the six strict orderings of x1, x2, x3. In all six cases we
have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
= 1 and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
= 0. If x1 = min(x2, x3) then
v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= min(x2, x3) and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= x1 otherwise. If x1 = max(x2, x3)
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then v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= max(x2, x3) and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= x1 otherwise. Thus the corre-
sponding 4-fold integral is given by∫1
0
(
1−
(∫1
x1
∫1
x1
min(x2, x3) d x2 d x3 +
∫x1
0
∫1
x3
x1 d x2 d x3 +
∫x1
0
∫1
x2
x1 d x3 d x2
)
+
(∫x1
0
∫x1
0
max(x2, x3) d x2 d x3 +
∫1
x1
∫x3
0
x1 d x2 d x3 +
∫1
x1
∫x2
0
x1 d x3 d x2
)
− 0
)
d x1
=
∫1
0
(
2
3
− x21 + x1
)
d x1 =
5
6
(11)
Due to symmetry we obtain the same values for all permutations pi with pi(3) = 1.
B.3.4. pi ∈
{
(2, 3, 4, 1), (3, 2, 4, 1), (2, 4, 3, 1), (4, 2, 3, 1), (3, 4, 2, 1), (4, 3, 2, 1)
}
: For permu-
tation pi = (2, 3, 4, 1) we have v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
= v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1))
)
, v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
=
max(x2, x3, x4), and v
(
τ(x, pi−1(1) − 1)
)
= min(x2, x3, x4). Thus the corresponding 4-fold
integral is given by∫1
0
(∫
x=(x2,x3,x4)∈[0,1]3
(max(x2, x3, x4) − min(x2, x3, x4)) d x
)
d x1 =
∫1
0
d x1
2
=
1
2
. (12)
Due to symmetry we obtain the same values for all permutations pi with pi(4) = 1.
B.3.5. Summarizing the 24 permutations for SSI1(v).
SSI1(v) =
1
4!
·
(
6 · 0+ 6 · 2
3
+ 6 · 5
6
+ 6 · 1
2
)
=
12
24
=
1
2
.
APPENDIX C. DETERMINING THE Nuc FOR TWO CONTINUOUS SIMPLE GAMES
From the binary case we can learn that very often it suffices to just minimize the maximum
excess in order to compute the nucleolus of a simple game. So for example vˆ we maximizing
the excess
x21 + 2x
2
2 + 3x
2
3
6
−w1x1 −w2x2 − (1−w1 −w2)x3
subject to the constraints 0 6 x1, x2, x3 6 1. With the aid of the corresponding Lagrange
function L(x1, x2, x3, α1, α2, α3, β1, β2, β3) =
x21 + 2x
2
2 + 3x
2
3
6
−w1x1 −w2x2 − (1−w1 −w2)x3 + α1x1
+α2x2 + α3x3 − β1(x1 − 1) − β2(x2 − 1) − β3(x3 − 1),
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we conclude that the maximum excess is attained at one of the solutions of the following equa-
tion system:
∂L
∂x1
(x1, . . . , β3) =
x1
3
−w1 + α1 − β1
!
= 0
∂L
∂x2
(x1, . . . , β3) =
2x2
3
−w2 + α2 − β2
!
= 0
∂L
∂x3
(x1, . . . , β3) = x3 −w3 + α3 − β3
!
= 0
α1x1
!
= 0
α2x2
!
= 0
α3x3
!
= 0
β1(x1 − 1)
!
= 0
β2(x2 − 1)
!
= 0
β3(x3 − 1)
!
= 0,
where we have set w3 = 1−w1 −w2. The resulting 27 solutions (x1, x2, x3) are given by
x1 = 3w1 ∨ x1 = 0 ∨ x1 = 1
x2 =
3w2
2
∨ x2 = 0 ∨ x2 = 1
x3 = w3 ∨ x3 = 0 ∨ x3 = 1
For each of these 27 combinations we can compute the excess ev(x,w), where x is specified
by w. Now we are just looking at the 8 solutions where x ∈ {0, 1}3 and compute the respective
excesses:
ev
(
(0, 0, 0), w
)
= 0,
ev
(
(1, 0, 0), w
)
=
1
6
−w1,
ev
(
(0, 1, 0), w
)
=
1
3
−w2,
ev
(
(0, 0, 1), w
)
=
1
2
−w3,
ev
(
(1, 1, 0), w
)
= w3 −
1
2
,
ev
(
(1, 0, 1), w
)
= w2 −
1
1
,
ev
(
(0, 1, 1), w
)
= w1 −
1
6
,
ev
(
(1, 1, 1), w
)
= 0.
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Thus we have that the maximum excess is at least
max
(∣∣∣∣16 −w1
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣13 −w2
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣12 −w3
∣∣∣∣) > 0.
More precisely, each choice of w 6= 16 · (1, 2, 3) leads to a maximum excess larger than 0. Next
we show that choosing w = 16 · (1, 2, 3) yields a maximum excess of 0, so that Nuc(v) ={
1
6 · (1, 2, 3)
}
. It remains to prove ev
(
x, 16 · (1, 2, 3)
)
6 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]3. We may check all
27 solutions and verify that the excess at these points is at most 0 or simply rewrite the formula
for the maximum excess at w = 16 · (1, 2, 3) to
ev
(
x,
1
6
· (1, 2, 3)
)
= −
x1(1− x1)
6
−
x2(1− x2)
3
−
x3(1− x3)
2
,
which is obviously upper bounded by zero for all x ∈ [0, 1]3.
For our second example minimizing the maximum excess does not help very much. Using
the fact that the geometric mean is always at most as large as the arithmetic mean we deduce
x1x
2
2x
3
3 6 n
√
x1x
2
2x
3
3 6
x1 + 2x2 + 3x3
n
for all integers n. If w1, w2, w3 > 0 the right hand side is at most w1x1 +w2x2 +w3x3 for
suitably large n. Using an easy but elaborated argument for the cases where some of the wi but
not all are zero, we can conclude ev(x,w) 6 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]3 and all w ∈ [0, 1]3 satisfy-
ing ‖w‖1 = 1. Thus from the maximum excess we can only conclude the trivial implication
Nuc(v) ∈ {w ∈ [0, 1]3 : ‖w‖1}.
In order to get an idea of how the nucleolus may be computed in similar cases, we have
considered the more simple two voter example v(x1, x2) = x1x22. Here minimizing the max-
imum excess is of little use to. A feasible approach might be to compute an exact expression
for the excess function in the domain [c, 1], where c < 1 is near to one, parametric in w1 and
w2 = 1 − w1. Using a somewhat elaborated case distinction and assuming a c sufficiently
close to 1, we were able to state an exact formula for the excess function using a sum of several
integrals. Those integrals could be evaluated numerically for fix values of w1, w2. By plotting
and comparing the excess functions for certain weights, we were able to compute the numerical
bounds 0.4553 6 y1 6 0.4555 and 0.5545 6 y2 6 0.5547 for all (y1, y2) ∈ Nuc(v).
